

DRAFT - 26 April 1973

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Reorganization of the Office of Security

25X9 1. Reference is made to your verbal instructions of 16 April 1973 that a discreet internal study be conducted with a view towards developing a new organizational structure of the Office of Security which would consolidate two Directorates and otherwise permit an overall reduction of

2. Attached herewith are the results of the two week study by the special Task Force which you appointed. It represents the best thinking of the members, and it attempts to provide some insight and rationale as to how we arrived at a particular decision. Although the Task Force maintains the view that this security review offers an organizational framework that is both functional and feasible, it does not mean that other approaches would not work. Most certainly any organization assumes a character which reflects the personal touch of the senior officer, and you may possibly wish to modify the plan in accordance with your own managerial concepts.

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3. Task Force members were quite unanimous in expressing the view that the most important ingredients of any organization are the people, and the success or failure of the reorganization will heavily depend on the selection of the right personnel to properly effect the various mergers. The consolidation of various functions and activities into the newly established Clearance Division, and Security Support Division is considered to be particularly significant, and, conceivably, the unification effort might not result in a merger, but the continuation of separate systems under a unified command. If the reorganization is to be successful, as we expect, there must be a complete integration of both personnel and duties from the previous DD/IOS and DD/PS elements, as well as Security Research Staff. Insofar as possible, officers assigned to these two Divisions should individually handle a variety of cases representing both overt and covert interests.

4. In accordance with your instructions, the Task Force members did not consult with Branch representatives, and there undoubtedly will be some loose ends at the working level during the shake-down phase. If you approve the reorganization plan, and disclose the program to the entire Office of Security, there undoubtedly will have to be more detailed follow-up studies in order to maximize efficiency

and arrange for an orderly readjustment. There are bound to be some "bugs" in the system. The ^{25X1A} [REDACTED] program immediately comes to mind as one project which would have to be reviewed in the context of a unification of DD/IOS, DD/PS and SRS. Quite obviously, the designated Division Chiefs, with increased areas of responsibility, will want to have their imprint on the Branch structure within their sphere of authority.

5. Although Task Force members reviewed the entire study and have endorsed the basic recommendation, there were two man units which explored individual programs, and they thus attained some additional specialized knowledge on particular Directorates. ~~Attention is also directed to the fact that there was a specific dissenting memorandum prepared concerning the consolidation of Administration and Training Staff and the Executive Staff.~~ Most certainly, the Task Force would welcome the opportunity to discuss this entire package or otherwise attempt to answer any questions that you might have about the reorganization plan.

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Attachment

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TASK FORCE APPROACH TO REORGANIZATION

1. The Task Force for Reorganization met on a daily basis during the period from 16 April to 27 April 1973, and every effort was made to encourage a free flow of information and an open exchange of views. A lot of individual opinions were changed or modified in the course of the discussions. The goal was to obtain a general consensus of opinion rather than total, complete, and unanimous agreement.

2. Some thought was expressed that it might be advisable to provide the Director of Security with alternative proposals or back-up recommendations on specific organization changes, particularly on those items which were heatedly debated, and it proved to be difficult to arrive at a clear cut decision which satisfied all members of the Task Force. This approach was rejected, primarily on the basis that we did not want to equivocate or "water down" our recommendations; we would furnish some rationale as to how we arrived at a particular decision; and we would clearly identify those important points where there had been strong differing views. On at least one issue a separate memorandum of dissent has been submitted to the Director of Security.

3. It is to be noted that on a number of key organizational changes, where one might have expected strong differing views, there was an obvious similarity of opinion, and a quick meeting of the minds. This related basically to the following:

A. The urgent need to consolidate and combine the security clearance/approval process into one component.

B. The need to cut down, modify, and change some of the programs and activities of Security Research Staff.

C. The need to consolidate overall security support into one component.

D. The definite need to consolidate the long range planning, programs, and budget activities under one manager.

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4. There was honest disagreement and differing views in the attempt to arrive at a consensus on the following:

A. The Deputy Directorate structure. Some preliminary strong feeling was expressed that the five Division chiefs might be given increased authority and report directly to the Director or Deputy Director of Security.

B. The marriage of Administration & Training Staff with the Executive Staff. There was concern about having a Support Officer come under the cognizance of the Executive Officer, and some feeling was expressed for combining "plans and programs" but retaining two separate Staffs.

C. Placing the polygraph program in the Security Support Division. There was some thought that this program was more closely alligned to the clearance process, and should be part of the Clearance Division.

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BACKGROUND ON THE THREE-DIRECTORATE ORGANIZATION

1. On 2 July 1965, the Director of Security advised the Executive Director-Comptroller that a thorough analysis and review of the organizational structure, mission, and functions of the Office of Security prompted him to recommend a reorganization in order to place increased emphasis on the fields of personnel, industrial, and technical security. This security concern was a reaction to the government's increasing reliance upon technical intelligence acquisition programs and to the discovery of technical surveillance operations by foreign intelligence services against U.S. installations abroad.
2. The proposed reorganization was approved, and the functions of the Office of Security were redivided among three Directorates, an Executive Staff, a Security Research Staff, and an Administration and Training Staff. The Deputy Director, IOS continued supervision of the field offices, of the Investigations Division, and of the Operational Support Division; and he also acquired responsibility for the activities of the Alien Affairs Staff.
3. The position of Deputy Director for Personnel Security (DD/PS) was created to provide for the supervision of the activities of the Personnel Security Division, Interrogations Research Division, and the Security Records and Communications Division.
4. The position of Deputy Director for Physical, Technical and Overseas Security (DD/PTOS) was established to supervise the activities of Physical Security Division and Technical Division. The Overseas Security Support Division was later established in 1968 and responsibility for this Division rested with the DD/PTOS.
5. By the same 1965 action, the Security Policy and Executive Staff assumed supervisory responsibility for the activities of the Special Security Center, in addition to the newly created Executive and Planning Division. The latter was responsible for staff work related to all executive officer and policy matters which were not subject to special systems of security control. The Special Clearance Center (previously a part of the SSC) was redesignated the Compartmented Information Branch of SR&CD, and it continued to administer the

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Agency's service of common concern to the U.S. Intelligence Community for maintenance of overall compartmental clearance listings.

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6. From a TO standpoint, it is interesting to note that in December 1965 the Office of Security had [REDACTED] positions, this reached a high of [REDACTED] positions in December 1968, and it decreased to [REDACTED] positions in December 1971. For purposes of the present exercise the Task Force has attempted to identify [REDACTED] cuts so that we can get down to a personnel stren [REDACTED]

from a previous approved FY 1974
celebrated [REDACTED]
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